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sunset Oct 21 2015

A reading guide in phenomenology

Seeing the World as World

Eugen Fink's 1933 Defense of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology — A Commentary with Marginalia

About this commentary

In 1933 the journal Kant-Studien published a long essay by Eugen Fink (1905–1975), then the twenty-eight-year-old research assistant of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of phenomenology. Its title was “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik” — “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism.” It answered the most serious objections that the neo-Kantian school of Heinrich Rickert had raised against Husserl. Husserl added a short preface saying that the essay contained no sentence he did not accept as his own conviction.

The essay became one of the most influential interpretations of Husserl ever written. French philosophers of the next generation, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida among them, read Husserl partly through it. It is also extremely difficult. Fink compresses a whole philosophy into sixty pages, writes in the technical vocabulary of German academic philosophy around 1930, and argues against opponents whose own positions are now largely forgotten.

This commentary does not reproduce or translate Fink’s essay. It explains the philosophy the essay presents, in an order chosen for clarity rather than following Fink’s own sequence, and it surrounds that explanation with marginal notes on the essay’s key terms. It draws on Husserl’s other works where they illuminate the argument, and it marks the places where Fink’s formulations go beyond what Husserl himself wrote elsewhere.

The commentary assumes no prior knowledge of phenomenology. Readers who already know Husserl can skip Part I.

How the marginal notes work

Many of the essay’s difficulties come from a single source: the same word means different things to different parties. Fink himself calls this a “terminological homonymy” between his school and its critics. Each marginal note therefore sets out, where relevant, up to four senses of a term:

  • Ordinary use — what the word means in everyday or general philosophical English.
  • Neo-Kantian reading — how Rickert’s school (Fink’s opponents) used the word, or how they understood it when they met it in Husserl.
  • Husserl and Fink — the sense the essay defends.
  • Heidegger — given only where Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) or his lectures of the same years use the word in a way that sheds light on Fink’s choices. Heidegger is never named in the essay, but he stands just behind it.

The notes appear as indented blocks marked with a diamond (◆), placed beside the passage where the term first matters.

Citations and quotations

  • Fink’s essay is cited as Fink 1933 with page numbers from the Spanish edition: Eugen Fink, “La filosofía fenomenológica de Edmund Husserl ante la crítica contemporánea,” trans. Raúl Velozo Farías, Acta fenomenológica latinoamericana, vol. 1 (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2003), pp. 361–428. The essay itself runs from p. 364 (Husserl’s preface) to p. 428. The original German appeared in Kant-Studien 38 (1933): 319–384, and was reprinted in Fink’s Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 79–156. An English translation by R. O. Elveton is in The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 73–147.
  • Short quotations from Fink are rendered into English from the Spanish edition and are kept brief. They are given for the sake of discussion; the full text should be consulted in one of the published editions.
  • Husserl’s works are cited by short title and section (§) number, so that any edition can be used. Heidegger’s Being and Time is cited by section. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is cited by the standard A/B pagination.

Abbreviations

Abbreviation Work
LI Husserl, Logical Investigations (1900–1901)
PRS Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911)
Ideas I Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Book One (1913)
FTL Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929)
Epilogue Husserl, “Epilogue” (Nachwort) to the Ideas (1930)
CM Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (French 1931; German 1950)
P&A Husserl, “Phenomenology and Anthropology” (lecture, 1931)
Crisis Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936; complete 1954)
EJ Husserl, Experience and Judgment (ed. Landgrebe, 1939)
6CM Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation (written 1932; published 1988; English 1995)
SZ Heidegger, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927)
BP Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (lectures 1927; published 1975)
CPR Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (A 1781, B 1787)

Part I. Orientation

Contents

§1 What phenomenology is trying to do

Phenomenology began as a demand for honesty about experience. Edmund Husserl, trained as a mathematician, came to philosophy convinced that its theories had drifted away from the things they were supposed to explain. Philosophers argued about perception, meaning, number and truth by building theories on top of other theories. Husserl proposed instead to go back and look: to describe carefully how things actually show up in experience before explaining them. His slogan, “to the things themselves” (zu den Sachen selbst), first appears in the Logical Investigations (Introduction to vol. II, §2).

Two discoveries organize everything that follows.

The first is intentionality: consciousness is always consciousness of something. A perception is a perception of a tree; a memory is a memory of last summer; a judgment is a judgment that the sum is correct. This is not a fact about some special mental act but about all of them. Consciousness is not a box with pictures inside it. It is a directedness toward things, and each way of being directed (seeing, remembering, imagining, doubting, valuing) gives its object in a characteristic manner.

The second discovery is that experience gives more than it strictly contains. When I see a house from the street, only its front is visible. Yet I do not experience a façade; I experience a house, with sides, a back and rooms inside. The hidden parts are not seen, but they are meant, “co-intended” as part of what I perceive. Husserl spent decades analyzing this surplus: the anticipations, background expectations, habits and horizons that silently shape every experience. Phenomenology became the patient work of making this hidden work of consciousness visible.

At first Husserl presented phenomenology as a descriptive science of experience that could ground logic and the theory of knowledge (LI, 1900–1901). By 1913, in the Ideas, he presented it as something more radical: a transcendental philosophy. Its method, the phenomenological reduction, was meant to lead the philosopher out of the ordinary, unquestioned acceptance of the world and back to the consciousness for which the world exists at all. Fink’s essay is a defense of this transcendental phenomenology against those who thought they already understood it.

§2 The people involved

Edmund Husserl taught at Göttingen (1901–1916) and Freiburg (1916–1928), where he retired as professor emeritus in 1928. He published relatively little in his lifetime and left tens of thousands of pages of research manuscripts. By the early 1930s he felt that almost no one understood what he was doing. In the preface to Fink’s essay he says that the criticisms he had seen missed his philosophy’s fundamental sense so badly that they did not even touch it (Fink 1933: 364).

Eugen Fink studied in Freiburg from 1925, wrote his doctoral dissertation under Husserl, and became his research assistant in 1928. For the next decade he worked with Husserl almost daily, revising manuscripts and drafting texts with him. In 1932 he wrote the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, a reflection on the method of phenomenology itself, which Husserl annotated closely. After Husserl’s death Fink helped save his manuscripts, which were taken to Louvain in 1938. He later developed a philosophy of his own, centered on the world, play and cosmology.

Martin Heidegger had been Husserl’s assistant in Freiburg (1919–1923) before teaching at Marburg. His Being and Time (1927) was published in Husserl’s yearbook and dedicated to him. In 1928 he succeeded Husserl in the Freiburg chair, with Husserl’s support. Fink attended Heidegger’s lectures too, and the essay’s vocabulary shows it. Heidegger’s role is examined in Part IX.

Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936) led the “Southwest” or “Baden” school of neo-Kantianism and taught at Freiburg before Husserl, then at Heidelberg. Rudolf Zocher and Friedrich Kreis, both from Rickert’s circle, wrote the critiques Fink answers: Zocher’s Husserls Phänomenologie und Schuppes Logik (1932) and Kreis’s Phänomenologie und Kritizismus (1930) (Fink 1933: 365, title note).

§3 The critics: neo-Kantian “criticism”

The name “criticism” (Kritizismus) comes from Kant’s three Critiques. Kant held that before claiming to know anything about God, the soul or the world as a whole, philosophy must first examine the powers and limits of reason itself. Its central question was how knowledge of objects is possible at all. Kant’s answer was that objects of experience must conform to forms the mind contributes: the forms of space and time, and the categories of the understanding. These are tied together by the unity of self-consciousness he called transcendental apperception, the “I think” that “must be able to accompany all my representations” (CPR B131–132).

The Southwest neo-Kantians gave Kant’s project a distinctive turn. Following Hermann Lotze, they held that some things do not exist but hold or are valid (gelten). The truth that 2 + 2 = 4, the rules of logic and moral values do not exist the way stones and people do. They hold, whether or not anyone thinks them. Rickert made this sphere of validity the true object of philosophy. On his view, knowledge does not copy reality; it is judgment that recognizes a demand, an “ought,” that precedes all being. The objects of knowledge are constituted when valid forms are applied to the material of experience. The subject that does this is not anyone’s actual mind but a “theoretical-cognitive I” (probably rendering erkenntnistheoretisches Subjekt, the epistemological subject): an impersonal “consciousness in general,” a pure form.

From this position Husserl looked like a half-convert. His early work, the critics thought, was naive: it simply described what is given. In the Ideas he seemed to move toward their own transcendental standpoint, and then to spoil it. Part II sets out their charges.

§4 Why this essay matters

Three features make the essay unusually important.

It carries Husserl’s signature. Husserl rarely endorsed anyone’s account of his thought. Here he wrote that he had reviewed the text carefully and found no sentence he could not acknowledge as his own conviction (Fink 1933: 364). For decades the essay was treated as the authorized statement of Husserl’s mature position. Part IX asks how far that is right.

It states the transcendental standpoint with unusual sharpness. Husserl’s published introductions to phenomenology tend to begin with familiar problems and approach the reduction gradually. Fink instead insists on how radical and strange the reduction is: unmotivated, unknowable in advance, inexpressible in ordinary language. This made the essay a touchstone for later readers. In the preface to Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty cited Fink’s characterization of the reduction as a kind of wonder before the world, and drew from it the lesson that the reduction can never be completed.

It names the problems of phenomenological language. Fink’s closing account of “transcendental illusion” (Part VIII), the ways phenomenology must be misunderstood because it can only speak in worldly words, anticipates later debates about the limits of philosophical language. Derrida, reviewing Fink’s collected Studien zur Phänomenologie in 1966, counted the volume among the most remarkable monuments in the history of Husserl interpretation (Lawlor 2002: ch. 1).

Questions for reflection, Part I

  1. Think of an ordinary perception (a cup on a table). List what is strictly visible and what is “co-meant.” Where is the line between them?
  2. The neo-Kantians say truths “hold” rather than “exist.” Is this a real distinction, or a way of avoiding the question of what truths are?
  3. Why might a philosopher think that the most important questions cannot even be posed from within ordinary experience?

Part II. The Charge Sheet

Contents

Fink’s first task is to state the opposing case fairly. He presents it as a coherent indictment with two counts, intuitionism and ontologism, which together support a third and most serious charge, dogmatism (Fink 1933: 366–371). He also presents a historical story that frames all three: Husserl’s development as a failed conversion to criticism.

§5 Count one: intuitionism

Kant distinguished two sources of knowledge: sensibility, through which objects are given to us in intuition (Anschauung), and understanding, which thinks them through concepts. “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (CPR A51/B75). Neither can do the other’s work. The neo-Kantians made this duality the backbone of their theory of knowledge.

The critics charged that Husserl erased it. Phenomenology, they said, models all knowledge on perception, on simply seeing what is there. Husserl speaks of “categorial intuition” (seeing that something is the case) and “intuition of essences” (seeing what a thing is in general), as if logic and mathematics were forms of looking. To the critics this was a category mistake with two consequences (Fink 1933: 367–368).

First, as a theory of knowledge in general, it is a form of empiricism. If knowledge is basically the having of an object present to the mind, then thinking is reduced to a kind of seeing, and the specific work of judgment and concept is lost.

Second, and more serious, as a theory of philosophical knowledge it is naive. Philosophy, for the critics, must ask by what right our knowledge claims hold: Kant’s quid juris, the question of legitimacy. A philosophy that accepts whatever is “self-given” in evidence as its final court of appeal never asks that question. It stops where philosophy should begin.

§6 Count two: ontologism

“Ontologism” is the critics’ word for treating everything as a being, a thing that is. The neo-Kantians held strictly to the difference between what is (real things and events) and what holds (valid sense, values, logical forms). Husserl, they argued, collapsed this distinction (Fink 1933: 368–369).

The evidence was the Logical Investigations. There Husserl defended the objectivity of logic against “psychologism,” the view that logical laws are just laws of how human minds happen to think. The critics granted that this was a real achievement. But to secure logic’s objectivity, Husserl treated meanings, numbers and essences as ideal objects, entities of a higher order that we can “see.” For the critics this was a disguised realism: the valid had been turned into a kind of being, “reified” into things.

The charge has a second, more consequential edge. If phenomenology treats everything as a being, then even when it reaches for the transcendental subject it will make that subject into a being too, an entity alongside other entities. And then it cannot do what transcendental philosophy must do: explain beings by going back to something that is not a being, the valid form that makes them possible.

§7 Count three: dogmatism

The two counts converge in the charge that matters most. For a Kantian, a philosophy is dogmatic when it makes claims about objects without first criticizing the possibility of knowing them. It is dogmatic when it takes things as “things in themselves,” existing independently of any subject, and treats truth as the agreement of knowledge with those things (Fink 1933: 370, 425).

The critics found exactly this in phenomenology. Its intuitionism accepts the self-showing of things as the final court; its ontologism treats what shows itself as independently existing being. So phenomenology never reaches the properly philosophical question: how is objective knowledge possible at all? At best it is a respectable prephilosophical science, a careful description of immediate experience. As philosophy it is “dogmatic” and “unscientific” (Fink 1933: 366, 370).

Fink’s eventual answer turns this charge around. He will argue that criticism itself remains dogmatic in the deeper sense phenomenology gives the word (§30).

§8 The story of a failed conversion

The critics read Husserl’s career as a two-act drama (Fink 1933: 370–371, 378–381).

Act One, the Logical Investigations (1900–1901). Husserl is a naive realist about ideal objects and a descriptive psychologist of the acts that grasp them. He turns from objects to “lived experiences,” but this “subject-relatedness” is merely the empirical relation between a real mind and the objects it knows. It is not the transcendental relation that critical philosophy studies.

Act Two, the Ideas (1913). Husserl suddenly moves toward criticism. He introduces a “transcendental” standpoint, a “transcendental I” distinct from the psychological I and described as “irreal,” a doctrine of “constitution,” and a “transcendental idealism” that claims to justify empirical realism. Each of these seems to echo neo-Kantian doctrine. The critics did not decide whether this was direct or indirect influence, but they read it as a turn toward their own position (Fink 1933: 371).

The flaw. The habits of Act One survive in sublimated form. Because Husserl still trusts intuition and still thinks in terms of beings, he cannot reach the pure, non-entitative form of the knowing subject. His “transcendental I” ends up as a second entity, a ghostly double of the psychological I with the same content. His “constitution” becomes a relation between inner experiences and outer objects. His “transcendental idealism” slides toward subjective idealism: the world made dependent on a mind (Fink 1933: 380–382). In Zocher’s phrase, phenomenology is an “intuitionist-ontologist aberration” from a properly critical idea of immanence (Fink 1933: 382).

Fink’s reply begins by admitting that the story is not arbitrary. The passage from the Logical Investigations to the Ideas does formally resemble a passage from naive to critical knowledge. Phenomenologists themselves describe it as an overcoming of naivety (Fink 1933: 372). And the Ideas gave the critics something to work with. It shares much of their terminology, its system has a similar outward shape, and its presentation of the new idea of philosophy is cautious and incomplete (Fink 1933: 377–378). But the story rests on two assumptions, both false. The early work was not dogmatic realism, and the later work was not an approach to criticism (Fink 1933: 371). Part III takes up the first assumption; Parts IV–VII take up the second.

Questions for reflection, Part II

  1. Is it fair to judge a philosophy by its method rather than its conclusions? Fink grants this right, but insists that a philosophy’s method is what it says its method is (Fink 1933: 366). Is that too generous?
  2. The critics say phenomenology is good prephilosophical science but bad philosophy. What would have to be true for a careful description of experience to count as philosophy?
  3. How could one tell whether a later thinker was “influenced” by an earlier one, or arrived at similar words for different reasons?

Part III. First Clearings: What the Early Husserl Actually Did

Contents

Fink declines to defend the Logical Investigations in full. A complete defense would require showing the hidden line of motivation that runs from them to the Ideas, and the earlier work, he argues, can only be fully understood in light of the later (Fink 1933: 371–372). He offers instead a few basic corrections. They are worth studying on their own, because they correct misunderstandings of phenomenology that are still common.

§9 Evidence is not “just seeing”

Fink’s first correction concerns evidence (Fink 1933: 372–373). What the Logical Investigations establish is not the primacy of intuition as a faculty but the primacy of intuitiveness, of fulfilled knowing over merely signitive or “empty” knowing.

The distinction is easy to grasp with an example. I can think “the bridge in my hometown,” with no image and no perception: the thought points at the bridge emptily, like a sign. If I then walk onto the bridge, the same intention is fulfilled: the meant object is now present itself. If I find the bridge has been torn down, the intention is disappointed. Fulfillment and disappointment are the two transitional forms that link empty and fulfilled intending (LI VI, chs. 1–5).

The key point is that evidence is not tied to sense perception. Perception is only the simplest case, in which the object is given “at a single stroke.” Categorial objects, such as states of affairs (“that the cup is on the table”), collections, wholes and relations, are given only in founded acts. These are acts of thinking built on perceptions, which bring something new to self-givenness: not the cup and the table, but the cup’s being on the table (LI VI, §§40–52). Seeing that is not a second perception of a strange object. It is thinking reaching fulfillment. The critics’ charge that Husserl levels thinking into seeing gets the doctrine backwards. Husserl extends the concept of fulfillment to thinking. He does not reduce thinking to sensation.

§10 Essences are produced, not gazed at

Fink’s second correction concerns the “intuition of essences” (Wesensschau), probably the most misunderstood idea in phenomenology. The critics imagined a mystical act in which the mind simply beholds a non-sensory essence. Fink replies that the essence, the eidos, is the correlate of an operation of thought (Fink 1933: 373–374).

The method is free variation. Take any example, say a particular sound. Now vary it in imagination: change its pitch, its loudness, its timbre, its duration. Keep varying, and notice what cannot be varied without the example ceasing to be a sound at all. Some duration, for instance, cannot be removed. What remains invariant across all possible variations is the essence (Ideas I §§4, 70; EJ §87). The essence is “seen” only in the sense that the result of this procedure becomes evident. The “intuition” of essence names the fulfilling mode of a spontaneous intellectual activity. It does not name a receptive faculty.

Fink concedes that the first volume of the Logical Investigations, in its polemic against psychologism, sometimes overstated the independence of ideal objects. But the second volume treats their objectivity as a problem to be clarified by analyzing how they are given (Fink 1933: 374). Husserl’s later Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) takes up the same questions at the explicitly transcendental level, as a constitutive account of ideal objects (Fink 1933: 374, note).

§11 “To the things themselves,” formally understood

The critics heard the slogan “to the things themselves” as a program of naive realism: a fixation on things, contents, the given. Fink replies that “thing” (Sache) must be understood formally (Fink 1933: 375). Anything that can be brought into view as itself counts as a “thing” in this sense. It may be a physical object, a number, a horizon, a sense, a reference from one meaning to another, even nothingness. The slogan is a maxim of research, not a thesis about what exists. It demands that one get past inherited interpretations and argumentative constructions to the actual content of the problem. In that sense even a construction can be “concrete,” if it brings genuine insight.

§12 Intentional analysis: uncovering anonymous work

Fink’s most important correction is that the critics overlooked phenomenology’s real methodological novelty: intentional analysis (Fink 1933: 375–376). A descriptive science simply records what is found. Intentional analysis does something else. It starts from a present experience and asks what is implicitly at work in it, what makes this experience the experience it is.

Return to the house seen from the street. Intentional analysis uncovers the anticipations of its hidden sides; the “appresentation” of what is not presented; the habitual knowledge of houses that I bring with me; the horizon of further possible views; the expectation that the house will still be there if I look away. None of this is noticed in the simple act of seeing. All of it is functioning. Fink calls it the “system of intentional accomplishment,” which is present in every act of knowing but concealed, “anonymous” (Fink 1933: 376).

Seen this way, intentional analysis is, in a very general sense, an exhibition of “the conditions of possibility” of an object’s being given. It is not, however, a Kantian deduction of a priori conditions. For the critics it remained “dogmatic,” because it describes the actual cognitive relation rather than its valid form. Fink’s reply is that the method of intentional questioning already sets in motion a problem that eventually goes beyond both naive realism and critical “transcendental knowledge” (Fink 1933: 376–377). What that problem is can only be seen from the Ideas. This is why the critics, by reading the later work through the earlier, read both wrongly.

Questions for reflection, Part III

  1. Try free variation on the concept “chair.” What can you vary without losing “chair”? What cannot be varied? Is the result a discovery or a decision?
  2. Fink says even “nothingness” can be a “thing” in the phenomenological sense. What would it mean to describe how nothingness is given?
  3. Pick an everyday act (reading a sentence) and list as many “anonymous accomplishments” at work in it as you can.

Part IV. Two Fundamental Questions

Contents

The heart of Fink’s reply comes next. He does not answer the charges one by one. He argues that they all rest on a single false assumption: that phenomenology and criticism ask the same fundamental question and differ only in their answers. If that assumption falls, then the “approaches” the critics praised and the “aberrations” they condemned are both misreadings (Fink 1933: 377, 382).

§13 Same words, different philosophies

Fink names three things that make the misreading understandable (Fink 1933: 377–378):

  1. Terminological homonymy. “Transcendental,” “transcendental I,” “constitution” and “transcendental idealism” appear in both philosophies with radically different senses.
  2. Formal resemblance of the systems. Both hold that philosophy grounds the positive sciences. Both present their “transcendental idealism” as a justification of ordinary realism. Both deny that the transcendental subject is the psychological individual.
  3. The restraint of the Ideas. The Ideas of 1913 was meant primarily to open a new field of concrete research. It states its new idea of philosophy only cautiously, and the projected parts that were to explain it further never appeared.

Fink grants that the critics had “an apparent legal basis” in the texts (Fink 1933: 377). The fault lay partly with the first presentations, which is also what Husserl conceded in his preface (Fink 1933: 364). But the critics compounded it by assuming in advance what they set out to show: that phenomenology was a variant of their own project. Fink calls this the “cardinal imputation” that blocks genuine discussion (Fink 1933: 377).

§14 Criticism’s question: the sense of beings

Fink proposes that every philosophy reveals its essence less in its finished theories than in the fundamental question that drives it (Fink 1933: 383). Criticism’s question, in all its forms, is about the conditions that make beings knowable as objects. It asks how objectively valid knowledge is possible, or, in Kant’s form, how synthetic judgments a priori are possible. Its answer points to a “founding sphere” (Zocher’s term): the relation of timeless valid forms to the pure form of consciousness, which precedes all experience and makes it possible.

This is a genuine advance over naive realism. Criticism does not simply accept beings; it explains them by going back to their sense, the form that makes them what they are. But, Fink argues, criticism never leaves the ground of the world. The a priori form it uncovers is the form of the world. Its explanation stays “immanent to the world” (Fink 1933: 383). Even criticism’s characteristic modesty, its refusal to claim knowledge of things in themselves, expresses this world-bound character. Criticism is therefore a mundane philosophy.

§15 Phenomenology’s question: the origin of the world

Phenomenology’s fundamental question, Fink says, can be stated provisionally as the question of the origin of the world (Fink 1933: 383–384). He deliberately leaves the formula vague at first. It is the oldest of human questions, the question of the beginning. Myth, religion, theology and metaphysical speculation have all answered it in their own ways, usually by referring the world back to a cause or ground beyond it: God, the One, the Absolute.

Those answers share a weakness that Kantian criticism exposed. They think the relation between the world and its ground on the model of relations within the world: cause and effect, producer and product, appearance and hidden reality. They “explain beings by beings” (Fink 1933: 384). Skeptical critique destroys such systems, though not the question that drives them. Criticism goes further. It shows that before one can ask where beings come from, one must ask what it means for something to be a being at all. But it then rejects the question of origin itself as unanswerable, and limits philosophy to the sense of beings (Fink 1933: 384–385).

Phenomenology, according to Fink, unites what the history of philosophy had kept apart. It takes up the old metaphysical question of origin, but in the radicalized form that critique makes necessary. Dogmatic metaphysics asked about the origin of beings. Criticism asked about the sense of beings, their a priori form. Phenomenology asks about the origin of the world: the whole unity of beings and their form, founded and founding together (Fink 1933: 385). From this vantage point criticism shares something with the metaphysics it attacks. Both are mundane: one affirms a world-transcendent ground, the other denies we can know one, but both assume the question could only concern a ground “outside” the world.

This is the essay’s boldest claim, and Fink knows it. It seems to make phenomenology a rival of speculative metaphysics, the kind of grand system-building that Husserl’s “rigorous science” was meant to replace (PRS). Fink’s reply is that phenomenology makes the origin of the world “the object of theoretical experience and knowledge”: it shows the origin, lets it be seen, and legitimates its claims through a method (Fink 1933: 385). It lives “solely in the pathos of research.” Whether this formulation is Husserl’s or chiefly Fink’s is taken up in §36.

§16 Transcendent and transcendental: retaining the world

Phenomenology’s method of access to the origin is the phenomenological reduction. Fink describes it here, in anticipation, as the systematic whole of insights through which the philosopher “transcends” the world and is led back to its origin (Fink 1933: 386–387). This raises an immediate worry. Does phenomenology simply posit a world behind the world?

Fink’s answer turns on the difference between a transcendent and a transcendental relation (Fink 1933: 387).

  • In a transcendent relation, the world is on one side and its ground is on the other, two separate terms linked by a relation. Dogmatic metaphysics affirms such a ground; criticism denies we can know it. Both think in this form.
  • In a transcendental relation, transcending the world does not lead out of it to something else. It opens up transcendental subjectivity together with the world, which is retained within it. The world remains “immanent” to the absolute; more precisely, it is discovered as lying within the absolute. What is transcended is not the world but the limitation of the natural attitude, which takes the world simply as the totality of beings.

So, Fink concludes, the world is what it is from its origin, and the origin is what it is through its relation to the world (Fink 1933: 387). Only in this sense is phenomenology “transcendental philosophy.”

§17 A new idea of science

If phenomenology knows the world from its origin, it cannot be a science in the ordinary sense (Fink 1933: 385–386). The concept of science we inherit is bound to knowledge within the world, of beings and their forms. Phenomenology keeps the formal idea of science, a unified body of legitimated knowledge, but transforms its content. Its knowledge does not stand beside the sciences, nor do they share a common genus called “science in general.” Phenomenology is prior to all mundane knowledge, because it makes thematic the ground of everything those sciences know.

This gives a new sense to the old claim that philosophy grounds the sciences (Fink 1933: 386). Criticism also says this, but its grounding is world-immanent: philosophy uncovers the a priori forms presupposed by the empirical sciences. Phenomenology claims to ground all mundane knowledge, criticism’s included, by knowing the origin of the world. Here as elsewhere, the shared formula conceals a radical difference.

Fink ends this part of the essay with a warning about his own procedure (Fink 1933: 388). He has used deliberately crude, “massive” concepts to clear away the confusion created by homonymy. They are signposts, not definitions. The real sense of phenomenology can only be gained by actually entering into its problems. This warning applies to every summary of the essay, this commentary included.

Questions for reflection, Part IV

  1. Can two philosophies that use the same words be said to disagree, if they mean different things by them? What would a genuine disagreement between criticism and phenomenology look like?
  2. Fink says criticism’s modesty about “things in themselves” is a sign that it remains bound to the world. Is modesty a philosophical limitation?
  3. What would it mean for an origin to “retain” what it originates? Can you think of non-philosophical analogies (a source and its river; a speaker and her speech)? Where do they fail?

Part V. The Reduction

Contents

Everything in phenomenology depends on the phenomenological reduction. Fink insists there is no phenomenology without it: whatever calls itself phenomenology while renouncing the reduction is “in principle a mundane philosophy,” and so dogmatic (Fink 1933: 386, note 10). The critics read the reduction in two ways. Read favorably, it was a method for reaching the pure, formal subject of knowledge, an “authentically critical approach.” Read unfavorably, it was a method for shutting out the external world and keeping only inner experience, a “philosophy of immanence” (Fink 1933: 390–391). Fink rejects both readings. To see why, one must first understand why the reduction is so hard to explain at all.

§18 Why the reduction cannot be explained in advance

Most philosophical methods can be described before they are used. One explains the problem, then shows how the method addresses it. Fink argues that the reduction cannot be introduced this way, for three connected reasons (Fink 1933: 389–393).

It is unmotivated. A theory is normally understood through the problem that motivates it. But no problem arising within ordinary life or science leads to the reduction. Phenomenology’s fundamental problem, the origin of the world, does not exist before the reduction. It first appears in and through it (Fink 1933: 389–390). So any attempt to motivate the reduction by an ordinary problem, such as how knowledge is possible or how to found psychology, misrepresents it. Such problems can serve as starting points, but they are transformed beyond recognition once the reduction is performed. Fink’s phrase is that the reduction “presupposes itself” (Fink 1933: 392). Only after it has been carried out does its motivation become visible.

It is unknown, even in its possibility. Many kinds of knowledge are unfamiliar, such as advanced physics, and talk about them presupposes actually doing them. But the reduction is unfamiliar in a stronger sense. It is not a possibility within the horizon of human existence at all. It “transcends us in our human possibilities” (Fink 1933: 391). This sentence, with its explicit use of the word Dasein for human existence, is one of several places where the essay answers Heidegger without naming him (§37).

Every first presentation of it is “false.” Any account of the reduction must begin somewhere, and the only available place is the natural attitude, the very standpoint the reduction abolishes. So the first account will necessarily present the reduction as one theory among others, answering a problem everyone already has. That is false (Fink 1933: 392). But it is not erroneous, Fink insists, and that includes the account in the Ideas (Fink 1933: 393). It is false the way a ladder is false to the roof it leads to: it must be climbed and then left behind. The falsity “cancels itself in the performance.” The great danger is to stop with the preliminary account and take it for the doctrine, which, Fink argues, is exactly what the critics did.

This is why Fink calls the introduction to philosophy the exemplum crucis, the crucial and tormenting case, of an exit from the natural attitude that has to be set up from within it (Fink 1933: 392). Husserl’s own late texts make related points. The Crisis (1936) treats the “total change of attitude” as comparable to a religious conversion (Crisis §35), and its several “ways” into the reduction each start from familiar territory and leave it behind.

§19 The natural attitude, re-understood

The Ideas introduces the reduction by first describing the natural attitude: the ordinary stance in which I find myself in a world that is simply there, spread out in space and time, containing things, other people and myself. This world is accepted as existing without question; Husserl calls that acceptance the “general thesis” of the natural attitude (Ideas I §§27–30). The reduction then suspends that thesis.

The critics took the natural attitude to be the attitude of ordinary, object-directed knowledge. Leaving it would then mean turning toward the conditions of knowledge (the critical reading), or toward inner experience (the psychological reading) (Fink 1933: 393–394). Fink replies that the natural attitude is not one attitude among others that could be exchanged for another. It is the encompassing condition within which all human attitudes occur, including psychology and criticism (Fink 1933: 394).

Two features of Fink’s account are especially important.

The natural attitude is captivity. Fink describes us as caught (verfangen) and captive (befangen) in it (Fink 1933: 393). We cannot step back from it as one steps back from an opinion, because every stepping back is itself one of its forms. It can only be broken, and that break is the reduction. Hence the concept of the natural attitude is not available at the beginning in its full sense. It becomes fully intelligible only from the far side.

The natural attitude is belief in the world. Husserl’s first description uncovers the belief character of all experience (Fink 1933: 394). The world is given as a “universe of validities” (Fink 1933: 394). Every particular experience posits its object as existing, and all these positings join in one comprehensive belief. That belief is not one belief among others, alongside particular perceptions. It is the “universal, continuous, self-changing consciousness of the world” that runs through all experience, the “continuous apperception of the world” (Fink 1933: 395). It survives every particular correction: when something turns out to be an illusion, the world does not disappear; the illusion is crossed out and the world goes on.

Here the decisive question arises: who believes? On the ground of the natural attitude, the answer is obvious: human beings do. Belief in the world is the way a particular being, the human being, exists in the world (Fink 1933: 395). But Fink points out that the believer is included in what the belief believes. To call myself “a human being” already means knowing myself as one among others, within the world and related to it. “Being-in-the-world and being in self-belief” as a human being are inseparable (Fink 1933: 395). So the human being is not simply the subject who holds the belief. The human being is also one of its contents.

Fink adds that the right response to this situation is not to treat it as obvious but to awaken an “enormous wonder” at its enigma: that the world has its being and validity in this flowing life of belief (Fink 1933: 396). Merleau-Ponty later took this wonder as the best formulation of the reduction.

§20 The epoché as discovery

The epoché (Greek epochē, “holding back”; the skeptics’ word for suspending judgment) is the step in which the general thesis is “put out of action.” The usual picture is of a philosopher who first believes in the world, then decides to stop believing, or rather to “bracket” the belief, and examines what remains. Fink argues that this picture, though not entirely wrong, misses the essential point (Fink 1933: 396–401).

It is not done in two stages. One might imagine bracketing the external world first and then one’s own existence, or the reverse. Fink rejects this as an abstract, piecemeal procedure, like an infinite series of particular acts of bracketing (Fink 1933: 396–397). Every particular act already presupposes the world as a pregiven horizon. Concrete life is a “universal, continuous, flowing apperception” that serves as the substrate of motivation for every new act. The genuine epoché brackets this whole apperception “at a single stroke,” including the self-apperception “I, a human being” (Fink 1933: 397–398).

It is a discovery, not a suppression. In ordinary experience the belief in the world is not known as a belief at all; it is simply the world being there. The epoché does not take a belief we already knew about and switch it off. It is “the very first discovery of belief in the world” (Fink 1933: 396). It reveals that the world we live in, including ourselves as human beings, has its being as validity, as the correlate of a believing life. In this sense the epoché discovers the world “as a transcendental dogma” (Fink 1933: 396).

It does not lose the world. Here Fink meets the obvious objection. If the epoché suspends belief in the world, how can phenomenology claim to know the world better than anyone? Has it not simply stopped looking at it (Fink 1933: 399–400)? The objection rests on assuming that the one who suspends belief is the same one who held it: the same I, first believing and then refraining. Fink’s answer requires distinguishing three “I’s.”

§21 The three I’s

This is the conceptual center of the essay’s account of the reduction (Fink 1933: 400–402). The epoché is not a straightforward abstention like deciding not to vote. It is a structural moment of transcendental reflection, and that reflection involves three distinct “I’s” within one encompassing unity.

  1. The world-captive I. I, the human being, a unity of validity, with my inner-worldly life of experience. This is the I of self-apperception, the I that psychology studies.
  2. The transcendental I. The I that has the world as pregiven and valid in the flow of universal apperception. This I does not suspend belief at all. It goes on performing it, and through that performance the world-captive I gets its validity as “human being.”
  3. The onlooker (Zuschauer). The reflecting I that carries out the epoché. It watches the transcendental I’s belief in its living performance, without joining in (mitmachen), without co-performing it.

This dissolves the apparent paradox. The epoché is an abstention on the part of the onlooker, not of the transcendental I. Belief in the world continues at full strength, and precisely because it continues, it can be observed. For the onlooker the world does not simply “hold”; it holds as phenomenon, as the correlate of a transcendental belief that only this reflection makes thematic (Fink 1933: 401–402). The world is not lost. It becomes questionable for the first time.

Fink draws a far-reaching conclusion: the reduction is at bottom a transformation of the self. It breaks the simple, “indissoluble” unity of the human I, divides it, and reunites it in a higher unity (Fink 1933: 402). In a pointed note he adds that this is exactly where phenomenology parts company with all forms of Kantianism. Kant’s transcendental apperception is the principle of the I’s indissoluble unity. It is, Fink argues, the form of unity of the world-captive I itself (Fink 1933: 402, note 17).

The phrase “the identity of the three I’s” names a problem, not a solution (Fink 1933: 402). How can these be one? Fink says only that whole disciplines of phenomenology lie concealed in this question. His Sixth Cartesian Meditation, written the year before, works it out in detail, and it is there that Husserl’s marginal notes register his most significant reservations (§36). Husserl’s own late formulation of the same tension is the “paradox of human subjectivity”: the human being is at once a subject for the world and an object in the world (Crisis §§53–54).

§22 Phenomenology, psychology and psychologism

The critics’ second reading made phenomenology a psychology that had overreached. Kreis complained that Husserl ends with a confused concept of the I in which pure transcendental consciousness and the individual empirical subject are strangely amalgamated (Fink 1933: 403). Fink responds by stating precisely how phenomenology differs from psychology, and from the “psychologism” into which psychology can degenerate (Fink 1933: 403–405).

Psychology is a science on the ground of the natural attitude. Its object is the psychic, the stratum of animation in animals and humans. It is a regional science: one domain of the world among others. To secure its field, it performs its own “epoché”: it sets aside the beings that are transcendent to the psyche and studies only the psyche itself. The setting-aside is partial, though, because transcendent things still appear inside the psyche as what is experienced, meant and believed. And psychology understands this appearing in a particular way. Knowing is a one-sided relation in which one being becomes aware of another, which is what it is whether known or not. Being known does not touch the reality of the known. Psychological experience, in Fink’s word, is “impotent”: the world does not come from our belief in it (Fink 1933: 403–404).

Psychologism arises when psychology forgets this. It tries to dissolve beings into their being-given, treats the transcendent as a mere correlate of opinion, makes the world an illusion, and ends by absolutizing immanence (Fink 1933: 404).

Phenomenology differs from both, in three ways (Fink 1933: 404–405).

  1. It is not regional. Its theme is not a domain of the world but the world as a whole. Its epoché is not a limitation (Einschränkung) within the world but a de-limitation (Entschränkung) beyond it.
  2. Its relation of validity is not the psychological one. Within transcendental belief, phenomenology cannot distinguish between “merely given” being and being independent of the giving, because transcendental “holding” does not have the character of receptivity, of impotence. Transcendental life is not a receiver of a world that exists anyway.
  3. It is not psychologism. It does not erase the natural attitude’s distinction between thing-in-itself and thing-for-us, or dissolve the world into representation. It questions back to the transcendental belief in which that distinction first arises (Fink 1933: 405). The worldly independence of things is not denied but given a transcendental interpretation.

Husserl drew the same line throughout his later work. The Encyclopaedia Britannica article and the Amsterdam Lectures (1927–1928) develop a “phenomenological psychology” as a positive science parallel to transcendental phenomenology. The two differ by a slight-looking but total shift of sense, which the transcendental reduction brings about. The Epilogue (1930) explicitly rejects the reading of transcendental phenomenology as psychology or anthropology.

§23 Why the Ideas sounds psychological

Fink admits that the Ideas invites the psychological reading (Fink 1933: 405–407). It describes transcendental subjectivity as a “region of pure consciousness” and as the “residuum” that remains after a hypothetical “annihilation of the world” (Ideas I §§33, 49). These are expressions suited to psychic interiority.

His explanation is methodological. The Ideas faces the problem of every presentation of the reduction: it must start inside the natural attitude. So after first introducing the epoché, Husserl deliberately returns, in Ideas I §34 and following, to a position that hovers between the natural and the transcendental. From there he gives an intentional characterization of consciousness, contrasting immanent perception (which does not give its object in perspectives) with transcendent perception (which does). He argues that the region of consciousness would survive even a total breakdown of the coherence of outer experience. Husserl himself calls these “transcendental preliminary considerations” (Ideas I §51). They are laid out with a view to the epoché they prepare, not as definitive doctrines about consciousness (Fink 1933: 406–407).

So terms like “region” and “residuum” are fluid by design. They belong to a moment of transition. The critics took them as fixed definitions and built their objections on them. Fink’s diagnosis is that the equivocal terminology is not careless writing. It is a symptom of the confusion that necessarily surrounds the beginning of phenomenology (Fink 1933: 407).

Questions for reflection, Part V

  1. Fink says the reduction cannot be motivated by any worldly problem. Yet Husserl’s books all begin with worldly problems (the foundations of logic, the crisis of the sciences). Is Fink describing a contradiction, or a necessary detour?
  2. Try to describe the difference between ceasing to believe something and watching yourself believe it. Which is harder? Which is the epoché?
  3. In what sense can one “know” the world better by suspending belief in it? Is there an everyday analogy (a critic watching a play; a therapist listening to a story)?
  4. If the three I’s are “identical,” what kind of identity is that? Keep the question open until Part VIII.

Part VI. Constitution

Contents

If the reduction is phenomenology’s method, constitution is its theme. Fink calls it the fundamental concept of phenomenological philosophy, the one in relation to which the true theme of phenomenology must be determined (Fink 1933: 414–415). The critics read it as a variant of their own doctrine: objects of knowledge formed when a priori form is applied to a given content. Fink argues that phenomenological constitution is something else entirely, and that the Ideas gives only a preliminary indication of it.

§24 Two kinds of noema

The test case is Zocher’s objection about the noema, which Fink regards as the critics’ most refined argument (Fink 1933: 407–408). Some background is needed.

In the Ideas, Husserl distinguishes two sides of every intentional experience. The noesis is the act side: the perceiving, remembering, judging. The noema is the object as meant in that act: the tree as seen from here, in this light, as blossoming (Ideas I §§87–96). The noema is not the tree itself, which can burn down, but neither is it a mental picture. It is the sense through which the act is directed at the tree.

Zocher argued that this concept destroys phenomenology from within (Fink 1933: 408). He assumed that phenomenology studies the immanent sphere of lived experiences, and that the immanent is defined by a criterion: it is not given in perspectives (adumbrations). Then a dilemma follows. If the noema is given in perspectives, it is not immanent and falls outside phenomenology’s field. If it is not given in perspectives, the criterion is wrong and phenomenology has no legitimate boundary. Zocher’s remedy was to reinterpret the noema in criticist terms, as a “semasiological” sense: a meaning-structure, not an entity.

Fink’s reply is that the dilemma depends on equating phenomenology with the study of inner experience. He resolves it by distinguishing a psychological and a transcendental concept of the noema (Fink 1933: 408–410).

  • The psychological noema belongs to intentional psychology, on the ground of the natural attitude. Every act has a sense, and to study an act is to study what it means. Asking whether this sense is “inside” or “outside” makes no sense. The psychological noema is not itself transcendent and not given in perspectives. It is the sense of an actual intentional act, distinct from the real object it refers to. That object shows itself through the noema in an open-ended process of fulfilling identification.
  • The transcendental noema can only be understood after the reduction. The epoché discovers transcendental belief in the world, and its correlate, its “noema,” is the world itself: the world as the unity of validity that lies in the flowing world-apperception of transcendental subjectivity (Fink 1933: 409). The transcendental noema is the being itself, in its hidden sense of being as transcendental validity. To ask whether a being “corresponds” to it is absurd.

What about the Ideas, which does speak of a relation between noema and object? Fink’s answer is that the Ideas means the distinction between the object in the how of its givenness and the object as what remains identical across many noemata. Since the analyses there are performed within the reduction, every legitimate distinction between noema and object is meant transcendentally. In transcendental terms, “relation to the object” means the reference of one act’s correlate to the synthetic unity of many, which constitutes the object as an “ideal pole” (Fink 1933: 409–410).

Fink admits that the Ideas is strangely indifferent to the distinction between psychology and phenomenology in its concrete analyses (Fink 1933: 410). The analyses of noesis and noema are valid in both, as if in “double relief.” This is harmless as long as the reader actually performs the analyses with the transcendental perspective in view. It becomes fatal if they are read as a finished doctrine from which the whole idea of phenomenology can be judged (Fink 1933: 410).

§25 The reduction has stages, and so does being

Fink now makes a claim that affects everything said so far. The reduction is not a single step. It has stages of thematic disclosure, and also stages of conceptual clarification, in which the concepts used to describe transcendental subjectivity must themselves be reduced (Fink 1933: 413–414).

First stage: the transcendental ego. The reduction first leads back to the transcendental ego, “the place of breakthrough into the absolute” (Fink 1933: 412). What becomes self-given is a flowing life of acts. Even here the concepts mislead. This life cannot simply be given a past and future on the model of worldly time. Its “egoity” cannot be pictured on the model of the human individual. It has no known “limits” (Fink 1933: 412). Unlike psychology, which studies the psychic in its general, shared structure, transcendental knowledge is at first confined to one flowing factual life. But “one” and “factual” are worldly concepts too, carrying more sense than they should.

Second stage: monadic intersubjectivity. Following the guiding thread of the “phenomenon of the world,” with other people already in it, the transcendental ego unfolds into a plurality of transcendental subjects, a “monadology” (Fink 1933: 413). Husserl presents the approach to this in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. Fink insists that analysis there is an unfolding of the reduction, not a psychological theory of empathy. The “monads” are not a worldly plurality of separate things. Their mode of being is an “implication,” a being-in-one-another that exists only in the transcendental.

Further stages: absolute subjectivity. Even the transcendental monadic totality is only “the first stage” of the phenomenological conquest of absolute subjectivity (Fink 1933: 413). Fink indicates but does not describe what lies beyond: deeper strata of self-constitution, ultimately the constitution of time itself (§27).

Reducing the idea of being. Here Fink answers the charge of “ontologism” at its root (Fink 1933: 414). Does phenomenology explain the world by a being outside it, namely transcendental subjectivity? No. The worldly and the transcendental are not two regions of beings; they differ “in the mode of their being.” The idea of being is at home in the horizon of the world, even in its most formal guise as the “is” of predication. That idea must itself be reduced. The concept of “transcendental being” must include a transcending of the worldly idea of being. If the critics call phenomenology “ontologistic,” they have first attributed the worldly concept of being to it.

Reducing the idea of essence. The same goes for eidetic method. The Ideas does not distinguish worldly from transcendental eidetics, and at its provisional stage it could not. But it is a mistake to understand the reduction through an unclarified idea of essence. The nature of the transcendental eidos must instead be posed as a problem from within the reduction (Fink 1933: 414).

§26 Constitution: the becoming of the world

With these clarifications, Fink can say what constitution is. The reduction seemed at first to give philosophy a theme outside the world, transcendental subjectivity set against it. The doctrine of constitution dissolves that appearance (Fink 1933: 415). The true theme is “neither the world on one side nor a subjectivity set over against it,” but “the becoming of the world in the constitution of transcendental subjectivity.” Phenomeno-logy is the logos of the world discovered as a phenomenon of transcendental validity. It is essentially “constitutive phenomenology.”

How does constitutive analysis proceed? Not directly. The reduction first discovers a subjectivity that already has the world as valid. It does not witness the world being built up (Fink 1933: 415). This “having” is first described in borrowed, worldly language, as transcendental “belief,” “experience,” “meaning.” All these words still carry the sense of receptivity that belongs to human experience, and the qualifier “transcendental” only marks the difference negatively. The constitutive question is what that having really is. The analysis works backward. It starts from the actual validities of flowing transcendental life and questions back to the sedimented processes that built them up. It awakens those processes and follows them down through strata (Fink 1933: 415–416).

The resulting constitutive disciplines follow the regions of the world: a constitutive theory of material nature, of animate beings, of the human being, and so on. But the world as the unity of all regions poses its own problem, which forces every regional analysis to be revised. The analyses also lie at different depths. For example, the “primordial” analysis of the solitary ego must be revised within the wider constitutive problem of transcendental subjectivity, and that too is not the ultimate foundation (Fink 1933: 416). Phenomenology has an inner stratified character, and that is why its central concept resists a definitive statement.

Why don’t the published works make this clear? Fink’s answer: the ground must be prepared first (Fink 1933: 416–417). Before constitutive analysis can begin, transcendental subjectivity must be interpreted in its elementary structures (acts, habitualities) while the precise nature of its bond with the world is still left open. That preliminary interpretation looks like intentional psychology, because at first it analyzes intentionality in the same forms psychology finds. Husserl sometimes calls even this preliminary work “constitutive.” Fink says that is only a forward-looking indication. In a footnote he adds that Husserl’s manuscripts, by contrast, already contain an extensive constitutive interpretation of the world (Fink 1933: 416, note 30). That remark became important once the manuscripts were published in the Husserliana edition after 1950.

§27 Three concepts of intentionality, and the question of hylē

Fink now distinguishes constituted and constituting intentionality (Fink 1933: 417–418). The intentionality given before philosophy is psychic intentional life, the human being’s way of being in the world, articulated into acts, attitudes and so on. The reduction reveals beneath it the transcendental life that this worldly life conceals. At first that transcendental life appears with the same articulation as psychic life, covered by it. In this respect the reduction “de-objectifies” and “de-mundanizes” intentional life. It detaches the self-apperceptions that install it in the world, and reaches the depth where the self-apperception “psychic life” is itself built up.

The decisive step is to show the productive character of transcendental intentionality. Psychic intention is essentially receptive: it is an access to a being independent of it. Transcendental intentionality is not receptive. Fink first calls it “creation” (Kreation), acknowledging that the word sounds harsh and doctrinaire, and then immediately qualifies it. Constituting is ultimately neither receptive nor productive, but a relation that worldly concepts cannot reach and only concrete constitutive research can indicate (Fink 1933: 418). Fink then summarizes three concepts of intentionality:

  1. Psychic intentionality, which is receptive.
  2. Active-intentional transcendental intentionality, which is still undetermined.
  3. Constitutive-transcendental intentionality, which is creatively productive.

These are not three intentionalities, but “one intentional life at different stages” (Fink 1933: 418). Psychic life is transcendental life, in a concealment of itself, in the form of constitutedness.

This explains a passage the critics found telling (Fink 1933: 419–420). Corresponding to their own pair of form and content, they found in Husserl a pair of intentional morphē (form) and sensory hylē (stuff): the sensations that intentional acts “animate” and interpret (Ideas I §85). They concluded that Husserl’s constitution is a crude version of theirs, with content restricted to sensations and form tied to a contemplating rather than a judging I. Fink replies that the hylē/morphē dualism belongs to the provisional level of the Ideas, where constitution is identified with the sense-giving of acts. At that level the deepest stratum of constitution, the self-constitution of time (Zeitigung, temporalization), could not yet appear, so hylē had to look like mere material. In truth phenomenological constitution has “no dualism of two heterological moments.” The hylē, too, is constituted, in the intentional self-constitution of phenomenological time, which does not unfold in acts at all (Fink 1933: 420). Husserl’s lectures on inner time-consciousness (1905–1917, published 1928, edited by Heidegger) and the “Bernau Manuscripts” (1917–1918) are where this deepest level is worked out.

Questions for reflection, Part VI

  1. Is the “transcendental noema” (the world itself as validity) a real advance over the “psychological noema,” or a change of vocabulary?
  2. Fink calls constitution “creation” and then takes the word back. Why might a philosopher use a word he knows is wrong?
  3. Why should the experience of time be the deepest level of constitution, deeper than perception or judgment?

Part VII. Idealism and Dogmatism Revisited

Contents

§28 Constitutive idealism

Both criticism and phenomenology call themselves transcendental idealism, and both reject “subjective idealism,” the view that the world exists only in individual minds. The critics took this agreement as evidence of kinship. Fink argues that the two reject subjective idealism for different reasons, rooted in different master oppositions (Fink 1933: 420–421).

  • Criticism is governed by the opposition empirical vs. transcendental. It rejects subjective idealism because that view makes an empirical being, the human mind, absolute. Its transcendental idealism secures “empirical realism”: things in experience are real, because their reality is grounded in transcendental form.
  • Phenomenology is governed by the opposition mundane vs. transcendental. It rejects subjective idealism because that is one form of mundane idealism, and it rejects every mundane idealism. It recognizes neither a necessary dependence of external things on inner experience nor a necessary dependence of beings on the a priori form of the world.

Phenomenological idealism is not about the priority of human subjects over other beings, nor of a subjective a priori form over objects. It concerns the priority over the world of a subjectivity that is “transcendental” in an entirely new sense, discovered only through the reduction (Fink 1933: 421). Fink calls it constitutive idealism: it comprehends the world by returning to its constitutive origin.

The most important consequence is that phenomenology does not deny the ordinary truths of realism (Fink 1933: 421–422). It does not overlook that beings are independent of human beings, that humans are insignificant in the cosmos, or that human knowing is receptive. It lets the unreflective realism of the natural attitude stand, but does not stop there. It brings that realism to a philosophical understanding by disclosing the world’s transcendental origin. The truths of the natural attitude are not refuted. They are recognized as truths relative to a situation that had been absolutized, and placed within “the full transcendental truth,” which contains worldly truth as one of its moments (Fink 1933: 422).

In a striking image, Fink describes the world as a “stratum” of transcendental life: the plane where all constitutive processes terminate, the surface of transcendental life (Fink 1933: 423). He adds that the reduction reveals the world’s “transcendental ideality” as “the ultimate self-objectification of absolute spirit.” He anticipates the objection that this sounds speculative. It is not, he says, a metaphysical construction assumed in advance, but a formula for the basic insight of the reduction. As an empty formula it means nothing; as the guiding thread of concrete analysis it can say a great deal (Fink 1933: 423).

§29 The a priori as the pregivenness of the world

Fink closes his discussion of criticism by asking whether the problem criticism addresses has any place in phenomenology (Fink 1933: 423–425). It does. Criticism’s problem is the a priori: the puzzling fact that beings are knowable in general before any particular being is experienced. Criticism answers by pointing to the a priori form of the world, constituted in the judging functions of the theoretical-cognitive I.

Phenomenology encounters the same problem first on the ground of the natural attitude, as the problem of the pregivenness of the world (Fink 1933: 424). Every experience of a particular thing is already oriented within a horizon of prior familiarity. We are always already open to nature, animals, people and the regions of being in general, with an unthematic knowledge of their essential styles. This openness belongs to the essence of the human being, an a priori “habituality” not acquired at any datable moment. In a note Fink sharpens it as the pregivenness of a surrounding world (Umwelt) that holds together through the flowing course of perception, and through endless change from one surrounding world to the next (Fink 1933: 424, note 39).

Every interpretation of this a priori that refers it to the human being stays on the ground of the natural attitude. That includes criticism, which only abstracts from the concrete human being to arrive at an impersonal “consciousness in general.” The human being remains the basis of that abstraction (Fink 1933: 424). Phenomenology does not stop here. The reduction makes it possible to inquire constitutively into the a priori style of the world itself. That transforms the critics’ problem into a properly philosophical one (Fink 1933: 425).

§30 What “dogmatism” means after the reduction

Fink can now return the charge with which the critics began (Fink 1933: 425). Both of their readings, phenomenology as a “critical approach” and phenomenology as an “aberration,” place it on a prephilosophical footing, in a dogmatic situation. But “dogmatism” means different things in the two philosophies.

  • For criticism, dogmatism means confinement within the attitude toward beings: naively positing objects as things in themselves, and with that the correspondence theory of truth.
  • For phenomenology, dogmatism is confinement within the natural attitude. Every philosophy that has not passed through the reduction is dogmatic.

So the following are all dogmatic in the phenomenological sense: everyday experience, the positive sciences, eidetic disciplines like mathematics, and criticism’s philosophical knowledge of the a priori form of the world (Fink 1933: 425). The differences among them are internal distinctions within dogmatism. The critics’ charge collapses: they tried to lower phenomenology to a dogmatic level that, by phenomenology’s measure, they themselves have never left.

Questions for reflection, Part VII

  1. Fink says phenomenology leaves realism standing “within its own sphere.” Is this a genuine reconciliation of realism and idealism, or a way of having it both ways?
  2. If everyday life, science, mathematics and Kantian philosophy are all “dogmatic,” is the word still useful? What does it gain by being stretched this far?
  3. Consider the claim that human openness to the “styles” of the world is an a priori habituality not acquired at any moment. Can anything be both a habit and a priori?

Part VIII. Transcendental Illusion: The Three Paradoxes

Contents

§31 Why careful critics must misread

Fink ends by asking what such a critique means for phenomenology itself (Fink 1933: 425–426). It is not merely an error to be swept aside. In answering it, he admits, he has repeatedly had to defend the sense of phenomenology against the literal wording of its texts. A careful critic who reads exactly what is written and still goes wrong reveals something important. The source of the misunderstanding is not careless writing but a confusion to which every presentation of phenomenology is exposed. Fink calls it the transcendental illusion of phenomenology.

The choice of Kant’s term is deliberate. For Kant, transcendental illusion is not a mistake one can stop making. Even once it is exposed, the illusion keeps appearing, the way the moon still looks larger at the horizon after we know it isn’t. Fink claims the same for phenomenology. Its appearance of being a psychology, or a variant of Kantianism, can be seen through but not abolished. He names three sources, three paradoxes, each built on the one before (Fink 1933: 426–428).

§32 The first paradox: the situation of utterance

Phenomenology begins with the reduction, through which the philosopher becomes the “transcendental onlooker.” As long as the onlooker simply investigates and organizes what it sees, there is no special problem (Fink 1933: 426). The paradox arises when the phenomenologist communicates, turning toward others to teach or argue. Then the transcendental attitude suddenly appears inside the natural attitude, as one philosophy announcing itself among others in the world. The phenomenologist addresses the “dogmatist.”

Is that communication possible? Speech presupposes common ground. All human beings, however much they disagree, share the ground of the natural attitude, and that is exactly the ground the phenomenologist has broken. Fink’s answer is that the phenomenologist does not fall back into naivety in order to speak. He places himself in the natural attitude as in a transcendental situation that is transparent to him (Fink 1933: 426). The situation is transparent to the speaker and opaque to the listener. Communication with the dogmatist is therefore provisional: it starts in the natural attitude in order to lead the listener to perform the reduction themselves. Genuine understanding presupposes that the listener has taken up the transcendental attitude personally.

This, Fink notes, finally explains why the reduction must begin with an “unmotivated” and “false” presentation, and why a complete presentation of it from the outset is impossible (Fink 1933: 426).

§33 The second paradox: the phenomenological proposition

The second paradox is grounded in the first. A phenomenologist who wants to communicate has only the words and concepts of the world, the language of the natural attitude (Fink 1933: 426–427). The worldly sense of these words cannot be switched off. It can only be limited, and only by other words that are equally worldly. So no phenomenological analysis can be presented adequately, least of all analyses of the deepest constituting strata.

An invented technical language would not help. Phenomenological communication is mainly communication with the dogmatist, who would not understand it. So every phenomenological sentence contains an internal conflict between the worldly meaning of its words and the transcendental sense it is meant to indicate (Fink 1933: 427). The danger is that the reader hears only the worldly sense, misses the transcendental one, and can then quote the text in support of a misreading. This is precisely Fink’s diagnosis of the critics: they understood Husserl’s words and missed what the words were pointing at.

This is also why the present commentary uses marginal notes. Each note is an attempt to hold a worldly word and its transcendental use side by side, so that the shift between them stays visible.

§34 The third paradox: the logic of transcendental determinations

The third paradox is the deepest. It is “the logical paradox of transcendental determinations” (Fink 1933: 427). Fink is careful about what this does not mean. It does not mean that no logic holds in the transcendental sphere. It means that certain logical puzzles that arise in describing transcendental structures cannot be resolved with the means of logic, because logic, even in its most formal shape, is tied to the world.

His example is the question already raised by the three I’s (§21). How is the identity of the transcendental ego and the human I to be determined? Are they the same I seen from two sides, or two different I’s? One is tempted to think of this as a familiar kind of identity in difference, like the identity of an organism that stays the same while changing. But, Fink argues, every ontic form of identity fails here, because the two are not in the same way at all. One is a worldly being, governed by worldly ideas of identity. The other is a transcendental being, which in principle surpasses the worldly idea of being (Fink 1933: 427).

Is the human being, then, the absolute? No. Is the absolute a reality beyond the human being that does not include it? Also no. “Separating and distinguishing are as false as direct equation” (Fink 1933: 427). Instead of a transcendent relation between the human being and the ground of the world, a transcendental one must be posited. It does not deny human finitude, transience and powerlessness in the world. It understands the human being as constituted sense, and thereby gathers the human being into the infinite essence of spirit (Fink 1933: 427–428).

This is the point where the essay comes closest to its unnamed interlocutor. In 1927 Heidegger had pressed Husserl on what mode of being belongs to the being in which the world is constituted. Fink’s third paradox grants that the question is real. The identity of the constituting and the constituted self cannot be stated in worldly categories. But it refuses Heidegger’s answer, which treats the being of the human being, Dasein, as fundamental. Husserl’s late version of the same knot is the “paradox of human subjectivity,” the human being as at once subject for the world and object in it, which he works through in Crisis §§53–54.

§35 Preparing a dialogue

Fink’s closing sentences are modest (Fink 1933: 428). He has not argued in order to win a polemic but to make a real discussion possible. Before two philosophies can debate, each must be distinguished from the other. Only then can they genuinely disagree. The essay is offered as a small step toward a situation of dialogue.

Its lasting lesson may be the one Merleau-Ponty drew a decade later: the reduction can never be completed. If phenomenology must always speak in worldly words, begin from worldly situations and describe identities that worldly logic cannot hold, then the return to the origin is a task that is never finished, not a place one arrives at. Fink himself calls the reduction “a permanent and unending theme” (Fink 1933: 412).

Questions for reflection, Part VIII

  1. Is the first paradox special to phenomenology, or does it hold for any radical teaching, religious, artistic or scientific, that asks listeners to change how they see?
  2. Choose a phenomenological word (“constitution,” “givenness,” “world”) and try to state its transcendental sense without relying on its worldly sense. What happens?
  3. Fink says the relation between the human being and the absolute is neither identity nor separation. What other relations are there? Are any of them clearer than Fink’s “transcendental relation”?

Part IX. Fink’s Accent, Heidegger’s Shadow, and the Afterlife

Contents

§36 What in the essay is Fink’s own?

Husserl’s preface is unequivocal: the essay contains no sentence he could not acknowledge as his own conviction (Fink 1933: 364). For decades this endorsement made the essay the authorized statement of Husserl’s mature view, and in many respects it is. But endorsement is not authorship. Two kinds of evidence suggest where Fink’s own accent falls.

Evidence from the collaboration. Fink worked with Husserl almost daily from 1928 until Husserl’s death. Dorion Cairns’s notes of conversations with both men (Conversations with Husserl and Fink, 1976) show Husserl relying heavily on Fink’s formulations. In 1932 Husserl asked Fink to write a sixth Cartesian meditation on the method of phenomenology itself. Husserl annotated it closely, and the annotations record both broad agreement and recurring hesitations (6CM, ed. Bruzina, 1995). Fink regarded the intention of that text as crystallized in his own term “meontic,” a philosophy of the absolute as what is “not-being” in any worldly sense. Scholars still debate whether the Sixth Cartesian Meditation fulfills Husserl’s project of a “phenomenology of phenomenology” or launches a critique of it (Ikeda 2011; Bruzina 2004).

Evidence from the formulations themselves. Comparing the essay with Husserl’s own writings of the same years suggests four places where Fink’s accent is strongest.

  1. “The origin of the world” as the fundamental question. Husserl speaks constantly of the “constitution” of the world and of philosophy as ultimately grounded knowledge (CM, Crisis). The framing of phenomenology as the answer to the ancient question of the world’s origin, a question shared with myth and theology, is Fink’s. It anticipates his later philosophy of the world (Sein, Wahrheit, Welt, 1958; Spiel als Weltsymbol, 1960).
  2. “Creation.” Husserl’s vocabulary for constitution is “accomplishment” (Leistung), “sense-giving,” “constituting.” Fink introduces “creation” and immediately qualifies it (Fink 1933: 418). The qualification is itself telling.
  3. “Absolute spirit.” The world as the “self-objectification of absolute spirit” (Fink 1933: 423), and the human being gathered into “the infinite essence of spirit” (Fink 1933: 428), carry a Hegelian ring that is rare in Husserl’s published work. Husserl did speak of absolute subjectivity, and in the Vienna Lecture of 1935 he argued that spirit alone exists in itself and for itself. But Fink pushes the language further.
  4. The sharpness of the paradoxes. Husserl’s introductions motivate the reduction: by the ideal of radical self-responsibility (CM §§1–2), or by the crisis of the sciences (Crisis). Fink’s thesis that the reduction is unmotivated and that every first presentation is “false” states as principle what Husserl usually treats as a difficulty. The three I’s, with the onlooker sharply set apart, are also more pronounced in Fink than in Husserl’s published texts. Husserl’s annotations to the Sixth Cartesian Meditation suggest he was more reluctant than Fink to separate the phenomenologizing I from the human being who does the phenomenologizing.

None of this means the essay misrepresents Husserl. Husserl read it, approved it and published it with his preface. It is best read as Husserl’s philosophy stated with Fink’s emphases, in the year when Fink was also working out the more radical Sixth Cartesian Meditation.

§37 Heidegger in the background

Heidegger is never named in the essay. Its declared opponents are Zocher and Kreis. Yet the framework Fink builds rules out Heidegger’s philosophy as firmly as it rules out criticism, and some of its sentences seem aimed squarely at Being and Time.

Where he shows through the text.

  1. No phenomenology without the reduction. Whatever renounces it is a mundane, dogmatic philosophy (Fink 1933: 386, note 10). By 1933 the most prominent phenomenology to have renounced the reduction was Heidegger’s.
  2. The reduction is not a possibility of human Dasein (Fink 1933: 391). A true interpretation of human existence presupposes the reductive escape from captivity (Fink 1933: 393). This reverses the order of Being and Time, where the analysis of human existence comes first.
  3. Being-in-the-world is bracketed (Fink 1933: 395). Heidegger’s foundational structure becomes one more self-apperception inside the natural attitude.
  4. The idea of being must be reduced (Fink 1933: 414). This is the most direct reply to the question of being: from Husserl’s side, Heidegger’s ontology remains bound to the world.
  5. The human being is not the absolute (Fink 1933: 427), and the essay closes with “the infinite essence of spirit” (Fink 1933: 428). Both reject any philosophy that starts from human finitude.
  6. Borrowed vocabulary. “Ontic,” “inner-worldly,” Dasein, Benommenheit, “interpretedness,” Zeitigung and the formula “explaining beings by beings” are Heidegger’s terms. Fink, who studied with both men in Freiburg, answers Heidegger partly in his own language.

One caution: Fink’s note on the “realist ontologists” within the phenomenological movement (Fink 1933: 372, note 4) refers to the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists who preferred the Logical Investigations. It does not refer to Heidegger.

The timeline behind it.

Year Event
1927 Being and Time appears in Husserl’s yearbook, dedicated to him “in friendship and admiration,” even though Heidegger had criticized him harshly in private (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Martin Heidegger”). The attempt to co-author the Encyclopaedia Britannica article “Phenomenology” founders on the same disagreement (Sheehan and Palmer 1997).
1928 Heidegger succeeds Husserl in the Freiburg chair, with Husserl’s support.
1929 Husserl spends two months of the summer studying Being and Time closely and fills it with marginal notes (McDonnell 2011).
1931 On 6 January Husserl writes to Alexander Pfänder that he has reached the distressing conclusion that he has philosophically nothing to do with Heidegger’s “profundity,” and that Heidegger’s open and veiled criticism rests on a gross misunderstanding (McDonnell 2011). In June he lectures on “Phenomenology and Anthropology” in Frankfurt, Berlin and Halle, against the anthropological turn in philosophy associated with Dilthey’s school, Scheler and Heidegger (Weber 2019).
1933 Husserl signs the preface to Fink’s essay in June. The same spring Heidegger becomes rector of the University of Freiburg and joins the National Socialist party, while Husserl, of Jewish descent, is being pushed out of German academic life.

How to characterize the quarrel. It is tempting to see Heidegger’s departure from Husserl simply as a betrayal. The personal history supports part of that picture. Heidegger knew how far he had moved away, criticized Husserl openly in his lectures from the mid-1920s, and continued to present himself to Husserl as a co-worker while benefiting from his support. Husserl’s letter to Pfänder ends by observing that everyone except himself had realized this long before (McDonnell 2011).

But “betrayal” undersells the philosophy. Heidegger had an argument, stated in print: the reduction leaves undetermined the mode of being of the very subject that constitutes the world. And he openly framed his work as realizing phenomenology’s possibility rather than preserving its existing form (SZ §7). Fink’s third paradox half-concedes the point. It admits that the identity of the transcendental and the human ego cannot be stated in worldly concepts, which is Heidegger’s question answered differently, not dismissed. A fair summary is a principled philosophical rivalry, conducted with personal duplicity, between two thinkers who each believed they were phenomenology’s faithful heir.

§38 Afterlife

The essay’s influence ran in three directions.

France. Merleau-Ponty’s preface to Phenomenology of Perception (1945) draws directly on Fink. It cites Fink’s description of the reduction as a kind of wonder before the world, and concludes that the most important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction. Through Merleau-Ponty, Fink’s version of Husserl, the reduction as an unending return to the world rather than a retreat into consciousness, shaped postwar French phenomenology. Derrida’s early work on Husserl (Introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” 1962; Voice and Phenomenon, 1967) engages Fink throughout, and his review of Fink’s Studien zur Phänomenologie (1966) praised the volume highly (Lawlor 2002).

Husserl scholarship. The essay’s claim that Husserl’s manuscripts already contained an extensive constitutive interpretation of the world (Fink 1933: 416, note 30) was borne out as the Husserliana edition appeared from 1950 onward. The genetic phenomenology, the analyses of passive synthesis, the life-world and time-consciousness now visible in the manuscripts confirm much of what Fink indicated, and complicate some of it.

Fink’s own path. Fink’s later philosophy moved from Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity toward the world as the encompassing whole in which all beings appear: a “cosmological” thinking influenced by Heidegger yet independent of him. In 1966–1967 Fink and Heidegger jointly led a seminar on Heraclitus in Freiburg, published as Heraklit (1970). The question the 1933 essay calls the origin of the world remained his question to the end.

Questions for reflection, Part IX

  1. Does it matter whether a formulation is Husserl’s or Fink’s, if Husserl endorsed it? What would count as evidence either way?
  2. Fink’s essay rules out Heidegger without naming him. Is there a philosophical reason for this silence, or only a personal one?
  3. Merleau-Ponty took the reduction’s incompleteness as its lesson; Fink took it as a permanent task. Are these the same view?

Appendices

Contents

A. Index of marginal notes

Each term below has a marginal note (◆) in the section listed.

Term Section
Absolute, absolute spirit §28
Accomplishment (Leistung) §12
Apperception §19
Being, beings (Sein, Seiendes) §25
Being-in-the-world §19
Belief in the world, general thesis (Weltglaube, Generalthesis) §19
Bracketing, disconnection, putting out of action §20
Captivity, absorption (Befangenheit, Verfangensein, Benommenheit, Weltbefangenheit) §19
Categorial intuition §9
Constituted and constituting; receptive, productive, “creation” §27
Constitution, constituting, constituted Part VI
Criticism, criticist (Kritizismus) §3
Dasein, human existence §37
Dogmatism, dogmatic §7
Eidos, essence, eidetic §10
Epoché §20
Evidence (Evidenz) §9
“Falsity” of the first presentation §18
Founding sphere, a priori form of the world §14
Horizon §12
Hylē and morphē §27
Identity of the transcendental and the human ego §34
Intentionality §1
Interpretedness (Ausgelegtheit) §11
Intuition, intuitionism §5
Irreal §23
Monad, monadology §25
Motivation, unmotivatedness (Unmotiviertheit) §18
Mundane, mundanity (mundan) §14
Naiveté §30
Natural attitude (natürliche Einstellung) §19
Noesis and noema §24
Ontic, ontological §25
Ontologism §6
Origin of the world §15
Performance, re-enactment (Vollzug, Nachvollzug) §32
Phenomenological proposition (Satz) §33
Phenomenological reduction Part V
Positive science, positivity §17
Pregivenness (Vorgegebenheit) §20
Psychologism §22
Sedimentation, habituality, tradition §20
Self-apperception §19
Self-givenness, givenness (Selbstgegebenheit, Gegebenheit) §5
Sense, sense-giving (Sinn, Sinngebung) §24
Temporalization (Zeitigung) §27
Three I’s §21
Transcendence, transcending (Transzensus) §16
Transcendental §13
Transcendental apperception §8
Transcendental I, transcendental ego §21
Transcendental idealism §28
Transcendental illusion (transzendentaler Schein) §31
Transcendental reflection, the onlooker (Zuschauer) §21
Transcendental subjectivity §23
Transcendent and immanent §16
Validity, holding (Geltung, gelten) §3
World §28

B. Chronology

Year Event
1781 / 1787 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (A and B editions)
1874 Lotze’s Logik develops the notion of validity (Geltung)
1892 Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (The Object of Knowledge)
1900–1901 Husserl, Logical Investigations
1905–1907 First manuscript versions of the phenomenological reduction; presented in Göttingen lectures (Fink 1933: 365, note 1)
1911 Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”
1913 Husserl, Ideas I; the transcendental turn appears in print
1916 Husserl moves to Freiburg, taking over the chair Rickert had left
1919–1923 Heidegger is Husserl’s assistant in Freiburg
1927 Heidegger, Being and Time, dedicated to Husserl; the joint Britannica article fails
1928 Husserl retires; Heidegger succeeds him. Fink becomes Husserl’s assistant. Husserl’s lectures on internal time-consciousness appear, edited by Heidegger
1929 Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic; Husserl studies Being and Time closely; Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?” and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
1930 Kreis, Phänomenologie und Kritizismus; Husserl’s “Epilogue” to the Ideas
1931 Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes (French); letter to Pfänder (January); “Phenomenology and Anthropology” lectures (June)
1932 Zocher, Husserls Phänomenologie und Schuppes Logik; Fink writes the Sixth Cartesian Meditation
1933 Fink’s essay appears in Kant-Studien, with Husserl’s preface dated June 1933
1935–1936 Husserl’s Vienna and Prague lectures; Crisis (Parts I–II published 1936)
1938 Husserl dies (April). His manuscripts are taken to Louvain
1945 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, preface citing Fink
1950– The Husserliana edition of Husserl’s works and manuscripts begins
1957 Fink, “Operative Concepts in Husserl’s Phenomenology”
1966 Fink, Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939, reprinting the 1933 essay
1966–1967 Heidegger and Fink lead a seminar on Heraclitus in Freiburg (published 1970)
1975 Fink dies
1988 Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation published (English 1995)

C. Bibliography

Fink

  • Fink, Eugen. “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik.” Kant-Studien 38 (1933): 319–384. Reprinted in Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939, 79–156. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966.
  • ———. “La filosofía fenomenológica de Edmund Husserl ante la crítica contemporánea.” Translated by Raúl Velozo Farías. Acta fenomenológica latinoamericana 1 (2003): 361–428. (Edition cited in this commentary.)
  • ———. “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism.” Translated by R. O. Elveton. In The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings, edited by R. O. Elveton, 73–147. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970.
  • ———. Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method. With textual notations by Edmund Husserl. Translated with an introduction by Ronald Bruzina. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
  • ———. “Operative Concepts in Husserl’s Phenomenology” (1957). Translated by William McKenna. In Apriori and World: European Contributions to Husserlian Phenomenology, edited by W. McKenna, R. M. Harlan and L. E. Winters. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981.
  • ———. Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958.
  • ———. Play as Symbol of the World and Other Writings. Translated by Ian Alexander Moore and Christopher Turner. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.
  • Heidegger, Martin, and Eugen Fink. Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67. Translated by Charles H. Seibert. University: University of Alabama Press, 1979.

Husserl

  • Logical Investigations. Translated by J. N. Findlay. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1970; rev. ed. 2001.
  • “Philosophy as Rigorous Science.” In Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, translated by Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
  • Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. Translated by F. Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982. (Also translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2014.)
  • Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. Translated by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989. (Includes the 1930 “Epilogue.”)
  • On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917). Translated by John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991.
  • Formal and Transcendental Logic. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969.
  • Cartesian Meditations. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960.
  • The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. (Includes the Vienna Lecture and “The Origin of Geometry.”)
  • Experience and Judgment. Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe. Translated by J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
  • Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931). Edited and translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer. Collected Works VI. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997. (The Britannica drafts, Heidegger’s letter of October 22, 1927, the Amsterdam Lectures, “Phenomenology and Anthropology,” and Husserl’s marginal notes on Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.) Publisher’s description
  • “Fenomenologia e antropologia” (1931). Translated by José Fernandes Weber. Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31, no. 53 (2019): 639–667. Online
  • Cairns, Dorion. Conversations with Husserl and Fink. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976.

Heidegger

  • Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. (Also translated by Joan Stambaugh, Albany: SUNY Press, 1996.)
  • History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (1925 lectures). Translated by Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
  • The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927 lectures). Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
  • Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Translated by Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
  • The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929–30 lectures). Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
  • Pathmarks. Edited by William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. (Includes “Phenomenology and Theology,” “What Is Metaphysics?” and “On the Essence of Ground.”)

Kant and the neo-Kantians

  • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  • Kreis, Friedrich. Phänomenologie und Kritizismus. Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte. Tübingen: Mohr, 1930.
  • Rickert, Heinrich. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. 1892; 6th ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 1928.
  • Zocher, Rudolf. Husserls Phänomenologie und Schuppes Logik: Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des intuitionistischen Ontologismus in der Immanenzidee. Munich: Reinhardt, 1932.

Later readers and scholarship

  • Bruzina, Ronald. Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
  • Derrida, Jacques. Edmund Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry”: An Introduction. Translated by John P. Leavey. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
  • ———. Voice and Phenomenon. Translated by Leonard Lawlor. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011.
  • Drummond, John J. Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990.
  • Føllesdal, Dagfinn. “Husserl’s Notion of Noema.” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 680–687.
  • Ikeda, Yusuke. “‘Die transzendentale Methodenlehre’ in der ‘VI. Cartesianischen Meditation’ Eugen Finks als ‘meontische’ Kritik an der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls.” AUC Interpretationes 1, no. 1 (2011): 83–98. Abstract
  • Lawlor, Leonard. Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Chapter 1 excerpt
  • McDonnell, Cyril. “The Significance of Heidegger’s Analysis of Death in His Advancement of Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology towards the Question of the Meaning of Being in Being and Time.” Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society 7 (2011). Online
  • Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Donald A. Landes. London: Routledge, 2012.
  • Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald McIntyre. Husserl and Intentionality. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982.
  • Sokolowski, Robert. Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
  • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Martin Heidegger.” Summer 2025 edition. Online
  • Zahavi, Dan. Husserl’s Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Suggested reading order for newcomers

  1. Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, for the basic vocabulary.
  2. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations I–II, for Husserl’s own introduction to the reduction.
  3. Fink 1933 (in Elveton’s English translation), with this commentary.
  4. Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, for a modern overview.
  5. Husserl, Crisis §§28–55, for Husserl’s late account of the life-world and the paradox of human subjectivity.
  6. Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink, and Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, for the collaboration and Fink’s own direction.
  7. Sheehan and Palmer (eds.), Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, for the Husserl–Heidegger quarrel in the documents.
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